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ABSTRACT
There is a circuit split between the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth
circuits concerning the level of scrutiny to apply to the regulation of alcohol advertising. The regulatory framework for the alcohol industry has a long and evolving
history. Since our country’s founding, alcohol has had a strong presence in American life, and it continues to enjoy a flourishing market. Knowing the alcohol industry’s history is important to understanding the current circuit split. The Twenty-First
Amendment repealed Prohibition and gave states the power to regulate alcohol according to their own standards. The protections granted by the First Amendment
have also evolved over time, especially concerning commercial speech within the
alcohol industry.
Missouri and California both effectively prohibited alcohol manufacturers and distributors from financially investing in alcohol retail businesses. These regulatory
schemes were challenged in federal court for violating the Free Speech Clause of
the First Amendment, resulting in a circuit split between the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits. In 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held in Retail Digital Network v. Prieto that California’s regulation banning
manufacturers from running advertisements with alcohol retail stores was constitutional and not an infringement of protected commercial speech. In 2020, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held in Missouri Broadcasters Association
v. Schmitt that Missouri’s statute banning alcohol manufacturers from advertising
for retailers was unconstitutional because it violated the First Amendment.
Both laws were similar in that they restricted advertising within the alcohol industry. The different outcomes resulted from a different standard of scrutiny being applied by each circuit. The Ninth Circuit applied the traditional Central Hudson fourpart test, the standard evaluation for commercial speech regulations. The Eighth
Circuit still evaluated the restriction using the Central Hudson test, but applied a
higher level of scrutiny derived from the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Sorrell
v. IMS Health Inc.
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This article examines whether Sorrell created a new standard for evaluating commercial speech restrictions, and if so, how it should be applied within the alcohol
industry.

I. INTRODUCTION
A. Development of the Three-Tier System to Regulate the Alcohol Industry
The United States Congress ratified the Eighteenth Amendment, which prohibited the manufacture, sale, and transportation of alcohol from 1919 to 1933 – commonly known as Prohibition.1 Congress passed this amendment to prevent the crime
and corruption associated with intoxicating liquors.2 Proponents of Prohibition were
persuaded that alcohol consumption was leading to an unsavory culture in America.3 In response to Prohibition, bootleggers and other criminal enterprises began
stealing and selling alcohol.4
The Twenty-First Amendment was ratified in 1933 and repealed the entirety of
the Eighteenth Amendment.5 States were fearful that criminal syndicates would
continue to dominate the alcohol industry after Prohibition, which led them to successfully lobby Congress to include a clause allowing states to regulate alcohol entering their territories.6 Article Two of the Twenty-First Amendment granted states
the power to control the transportation of alcohol within their borders. 7
Following the end of Prohibition, states quickly developed regulatory frameworks for the alcohol industry,8 which included the creation of three-tier and tiedhouse systems to curtail the influence of powerful alcohol manufacturers over lesspowerful retailers.9 Under the traditional three-tier system, the interests of producers, wholesalers, and retailers are all separated.10 Each level must obtain a different
type of license to sell. Manufacturers are only licensed to sell to wholesalers or
distributors, wholesalers are only licensed to sell to retailers, and retailers are only
licensed to sell to consumers.11 Except for codified exceptions, each tier must stay
within its lane and not conduct the business limited to other levels. 12 For example,
a producer like Anheuser-Busch cannot sell their product directly to a bar or liquor
store.13 Similarly, tied-house laws generally prevent owners of businesses in one
tier from investing in a business in a different tier.14
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII.
2. See Mark Thorton, Alcohol Prohibition Was a Failure, CATO INSTITUTE (July 17, 1991),
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/alcohol-prohibition-was-failure.
3. Temperance & Prohibition: Why Prohibition, THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, https://prohibition.osu.edu/why-prohibition (last visited April 30, 2021).
4. See Amy Murphy, Discarding the North Dakota Dictum: An Argument for Strict Scrutiny of the
Three-tier Distribution System, 110 MICH. L. REV. 819, 820 (2012).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2; see also Murphy, supra note 2, at 821.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
8. See Barbara C. Beliveau & M. Elizabeth Rouse, Prohibition and Repeal: A Short History of the
Wine Industry’s Regulation in the United States, 5 J. WINE ECON. 53, 57 (2010).
9. Missouri Broadcasters Association v. Schmitt, 946 F.3d 453, 456 (8th Cir. 2020).
10. Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839, 843 (9th Cir. 2017).
11. Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Association v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2457 (2019).
12. See Beliveau, supra note 8, at 57.
13. See Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449.
14. See generally id. (explaining that a corporation has residency restrictions that limit their ability to
get a retail license which, practically, means that no publicly traded corporation may operate a liquor
store in their respective state.)

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol5/iss1/11

2

Middleton: Regulations in Alcohol Advertising: Scrutiny Applied to Commercia

No. 1]

Regulations in Alcohol Advertising

113

II. COMMERCIAL SPEECH STANDARD
A. The Central Hudson Test
Commercial speech, or advertising, is “expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”15 Until 45 years ago, commercial
speech did not receive First Amendment protection.16 In 1975, the Supreme Court
decided in Bigelow v. Virginia that commercial advertisements are protected under
the First Amendment’s free speech clause.17 The Court went even further one year
later in Virginia State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., holding that commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment because
truthful advertising is in the people’s interest.18 Many questions concerning the
scope of First Amendment protections of commercial speech protections were left
unanswered following these cases.19 Chief among these questions was which level
of scrutiny should be applied to commercial speech.20 The Supreme Court answered
many of those questions with Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York in 1980.21
In Central Hudson, the New York Public Service Commission banned a power
company’s advertisements that contained truthful information and were intended to
increase sales.22 The Court had to evaluate the constitutionality of that speech restriction. In doing so, the Court held that commercial speech is afforded less protection than political, artistic, or other core speech, but is still shielded by the First
Amendment.23 Advertising to make profits is a form of speech and is protected
against unwarranted regulation.24
Central Hudson provided the framework for the modern test that courts apply
to determine whether government regulations go too far in restricting commercial
speech.25 The test consists of four elements: (1) commercial speech must not be
misleading and must concern lawful activity, (2) the governmental interest asserted
must be substantial, (3) the governmental interest asserted is directly advanced by
the regulation, and (4) the regulation “is not more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest.”26 The final three elements will not be considered if the first
element is not met.27

15. Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557,
561 (1980).
16. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Christina E. Wells, Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Caroline Mala Corbin, THE
FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES AND THEORY 303 (3rd ed. 2017).
17. 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975).
18. 425 U.S. 748, 772-73 (1976).
19. See Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Peril of Parity, 25 WM & MARY BILL RTS. J
965, 968 (2017).
20. See id.
21. 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Schauer, supra note 19.
22. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 559.
23. Id. at 562; Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455 (1978).
24. Virginia State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761
(1976).
25. Krotoszynski, supra note 16.
26. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564-66.
27. See Schauer, supra note 19, at 973-74.
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Effectively, the Central Hudson test only applies to lawful commercial speech
that is not misleading.28 The Court held that the government’s power to regulate
speech is lessened when the speech is truthful and concerns legal activity.29 The test
weighs governmental interests against free speech interests to determine if regulations are warranted.
The first element was easily met in Central Hudson due to the Commission not
claiming that the challenged advertising was either illegal or misleading.30 But, the
Commission did argue that the advertising was not a form of protected speech because the speech was not worth anything due to Central Hudson being an electrical
utility company, and thus having a monopoly in the area. 31 The Court did not see
any merit in that argument since the advertising still provided useful information to
consumers.32
Next, the Commission had to prove that its interests in banning the advertisements were substantial.33 The Commission stated two interests: (1) conserving energy during the fuel shortage, and (2) keeping a fair market with efficient rates. 34
The Court easily concluded that this second element was also met, in that conserving energy during a crisis and keeping fair rates for electricity were both substantial
interests.35
The Court then analyzed whether the advertising ban directly advanced each
asserted interests.36 The point of advertising is to increase sales, so the Court easily
found the connection between energy consumption and advertising.37 However, the
Court concluded the stated interest of fair markets was too speculative. 38 There were
too many other factors to account for that could contribute to an unfair market besides advertising.39
The final element of the test prevents the government from broadly restricting
speech. The government cannot entirely suppress information when a narrower restriction would serve the stated interest.40 In Central Hudson, New York faced an
energy crisis due to a shortage in fuel stock reserves.41 Advertisements for the utility
company went against the policy concerns of New York because they encouraged
increased energy consumption.42 Nevertheless, the Court applied the “intermediate
scrutiny”43 test to the restriction and determined the complete advertising ban was
unconstitutional because a more limited regulation could have served the state’s
interest.44
28. See id.
29. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980).
30. See id. at 566-67.
31. Id. at 567.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 566.
34. See id. at 568-69.
35. Id. at 568.
36. Id. at 568-69.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 569.
39. Id. at 569.
40. Id. at 565.
41. Id. at 559.
42. See Lora E. Barnhart Driscoll, Citizens United v. Central Hudson: A Rationale for Simplifying
And Clarifying the First Amendment’s Protections for Nonpolitical Advertisements, 19 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 213, 218 (2011).
43. See id. at 219.
44. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 571 (1980).
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B. Heightened Level of Scrutiny with Sorrel
The Central Hudson four-element test remained the standard for thirty years.45
Commercial speech earned another level of protection in 2011, following Sorrell v.
IMS Health Inc.46 Vermont imposed a law on pharmacies that restricted them from
disclosing information on doctors’ prescribing practices for marketing purposes.47
This regulation restricted speech of certain speakers (pharmacies) and only restricted certain content (doctors’ prescribing practices). 48 Therefore, the ban was a
content and speaker-based burden on speech.49
The Sorrell Court stated that it would not make a difference whether the new
“heightened standard” or the traditional intermediate standard was applied. 50 For
that reason, the Court applied the traditional Central Hudson intermediate test because the outcome would be the same either way.51 Still, the Court held that heightened scrutiny is the correct standard when the government imposes content and
speaker-based restrictions on commercial speech.52 Additionally, the Sorrell Court
reiterated one of their previous holdings from Ward v. Rock Against Racism that
heightened scrutiny applies when the government restricts speech because the government disagrees with the message being conveyed.53
A comprehensive reading of the Sorrell opinion shows that the Supreme Court
believed a more exacting level of scrutiny is deserved for evaluating commercial
speech regulations than the intermediate scrutiny derived from Central Hudson.54
In deciding Sorrell, the Court mentions the term “heightened” ten times in the majority opinion, without ever clearly explaining what “heightened” means.55 The
Court uses different phrasing when applying the four-part test.56
The Court has gradually increased the protections to commercial speech in the
past forty years. In 1974, First Amendment protections for commercial speech were
practically non-existent.57 Then in 1975, with Bigelow, the Supreme Court opined
that the free speech clause does extend to advertising.58 With Central Hudson in
1980, the Court provided a framework for evaluating restrictions on commercial
speech and held that government interests must be substantially furthered by the
speech restriction – known as intermediate scrutiny.59 Taking the new heightened
scrutiny from Sorrell into account, this movement from the Supreme Court of

45. See Nat Stern & Mark Joseph Stern, Advancing an Adaptive Standard of Strict Scrutiny for Content -Based Commercial Speech Regulation, 47 UNIV. RICH. L. REV. 1171, 1184 (2013).
46. See 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
47. Id. at 557.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 557-58.
50. See generally id. at 571 (explaining that the case could be resolved even if the information was a
mere commodity.)
51. See id. at 571-72.
52. Id. at 566.
53. Id.
54. Stern, supra note 45, at 1171.
55. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
56. Infra Part IV, Section B.
57. Krotoszynski, supra note 16.
58. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975).
59. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
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promoting protections for commercial speech shows a trend of “anti-paternalism”
regarding speech restrictions and a tendency to favor the marketplace of ideas. 60

III. SPEECH RESTRICTIONS ON THE ALCOHOL INDUSTRY
A. History on Alcohol Advertising
Pursuant to the Twenty-First Amendment, many states enacted robust regulatory schemes to control the alcohol industry.61 States also interpreted the TwentyFirst Amendment to shield their regulations from First Amendment protections. 62
The Supreme Court held in 44 Liquormart that the Twenty-First Amendment does
not give states the license to ignore other provisions in the Constitution, like the
Free Speech Clause.63 This was an important holding that informed states they cannot enact burdensome commercial speech restrictions on alcohol advertising under
the guise of the Twenty-First Amendment.
Tied-house laws that many states enacted post-Prohibition prevent the three
separate tiers of manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers from financially investing
in different levels of the tier system.64 This includes advertising; a manufacturer or
wholesaler cannot advertise for a retailer.65 For example, Anheuser-Busch cannot
pay for a roadside billboard that says, “Great priced Budweiser bottles at QuikTrip
convenience stores.” Many states, however, have codified exceptions for microbreweries that allow small breweries to sell alcohol on their premises and advertise for themselves.66

B. 8th Circuit - Missouri Broadcasters Association
Like many other states, Missouri adopted a three-tier system to regulate its alcohol industry.67 These regulations are collectively known as “tied-house” laws.68
Missouri’s statute regulating alcohol includes a provision strictly prohibiting
wholesalers and distributors from having any financial interest in “the retail business for sale of intoxicating liquors.”69 Missouri categorizes retail advertising as a
financial interest and prohibits wholesalers and distributors from advertising for retail liquor businesses.70 Missouri does allow exceptions to this general ban. Producers and distributors can advertise for retailers if they list more than one business in
the advertisement and the advertisement does not list the price of the alcoholic product.71
60. Stern, supra note 45, at 1187.
61. See discussion supra Part I, Section A.
62. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 (1996).
63. Id. at 516.
64. See Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839, 843 (9th Cir. 2017).
65. See e.g., Missouri Broadcasters Association v. Schmitt, 946 F.3d 453, 456 (8 th Cir. 2020);
Retail Digital Network, 861 F. 3d at 843.
66. See e.g., MT. CODE ANN. § 16-3-213 (2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 311.195 (2016).
67. MO. REV. STAT. § 311.010-.950 (2016).
68. Missouri Broadcasters Association v. Schmitt, 946 F.3d 453, 456 (8 th Cir. 2020).
69. MO. REV. STAT. § 311.070.1 (2020).
70. Missouri Broadcasters, 946 U.S. at 457.
71. MO. REV. STAT. § 311.070.4(10).
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Missouri has an additional regulation prohibiting retailers from advertising discounted drinks outside their establishment.72 Under this regulation, it would be illegal for a bar to advertise that they have “$1 bottles of beer on Mondays,” or for a
liquor store to advertise a 12-pack of beer for $5. Retailers are allowed to advertise
these discounts inside of their establishments. 73 It is not illegal to sell discounted
alcohol, just to advertise it to the public.
The Missouri Broadcasters Association brought a suit challenging the statute
and regulations discussed above that restrict alcohol advertising. 74 After the case
was initially dismissed in federal district court, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth District reversed that decision and sent it back to trial. 75 Missouri
Broadcasters then earned a judgment in their favor with a two-day bench trial. The
state appealed on the following grounds: “(1) the Statute does not implicate the First
Amendment, (2) even if the statute implicates the First Amendment, it passes the
Central Hudson test for commercial speech and subsection 4(10) does not compel
speech, and (3) the Regulations are also constitutional under Central Hudson.”76
The three-judge panel at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected
the state’s arguments and affirmed the trial court’s decision that Missouri’s advertising regulations violate the First Amendment.77
Relying on Sorrell and 44 Liquormart, the court determined that the challenged
statute implicates the First Amendment.78 The statute “imposes a burden based on
the content of speech and the identity of the speaker” by limiting the advertisements
producers and distributors can run.79 Missouri’s argument that the statute’s sole purpose was to regulate economic activity fell flat with the court, because its “practical
operation” did impose a speech-based burden.80 Relying on 44 Liquormart, the
court opined that the Twenty-First Amendment does not allow the state to infringe
upon the rights granted by the First Amendment.81
The court then evaluated the statute using the Central Hudson test. Both parties
agreed that the first element was met, in that the statute concerned lawful and nonmisleading speech.82 The court implied that the second element was also met, as
keeping an “orderly marketplace” – preventing alcohol retailers from being unduly
influenced by more powerful distributors and manufacturers – was a substantial interest.83 Missouri stated their liquor control laws were intended “to promote responsible consumption, combat illegal underage drinking, and … [maintain] an orderly
marketplace composed of state-licensed alcohol producers, importers, distributors,
and retailers.”84

72. See MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 11 § 70-2.240(5)(I) (2019).
73. See generally id. (indicating that the regulation prevents only advertisement, not specifically preventing sales.)
74. Missouri Broadcasters Association v. Schmitt, 946 F.3d 453, 458 (8 th Cir. 2020).
75. See id.
76. Id. at 463.
77. Id. at 463.
78. Id. at 459.
79. Id. (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011)).
80. Missouri Broadcasters Association v. Schmitt, 946 F.3d 453, 459 (8 th Cir. 2020).
81. See id.
82. Id. at 60.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 457.
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Next, Missouri needed to show that the statute banning inter-tier retail advertising directly advanced its substantial interest.85 The court relied on 44 Liquormart
in requiring Missouri to prove that their statute advanced the state’s interest – preventing undue influence – in a significant way.86 Missouri pointed to a consensus
among other states that tied-house laws are necessary to reduce the undue influence.87 The court found the argument unpersuasive since Missouri did not address
how its statute specifically impacts Missouri or if it was needed to stop undue influence.88 The court also found the number of exemptions in the statute rendered it
ineffective.89 In particular, it is nearly impossible for the statute to prevent undue
influence, because although producers cannot advertise products with a retailer’s
name on the advertisement, they can supply retailers with generic product advertisements.90 This discrepancy makes it nearly impossible for the statute to prevent
undue influence.
Even though Missouri failed to meet the third element, the court continued to
evaluate whether the statute met the fourth element of not being more extensive
than necessary to serve the stated interest.91 The Eighth Circuit took the Sorrell
approach by putting the burden on Missouri to show that the restriction was not
overburdensome, and determined that the restriction on speech was more extensive
than necessary because Missouri did not offer proof to the contrary. 92 The court
listed alternative methods that Missouri could have employed to meet its stated interest.93 Policing the three-tier system, removing the exemptions, monitoring the
advertising of manufacturers, or creating self-reporting mechanisms were all possible alternatives according to the court.94
The Eighth Circuit also found the regulations that restrict advertising of discounted prices failed to meet the third and fourth elements of Central Hudson.95 As
with the statute, Missouri failed to provide any empirical evidence or expert opinions that demonstrated the regulations further the state’s interest. 96
The Eighth Circuit applied the heightened scrutiny discussed in Sorrell to evaluate the speech restriction using the Central Hudson four-part test. The court put
the burden on the government to prove that the restriction does further a substantial
state interest and the restriction was created with that goal in mind.97

C. Ninth Circuit - Retail Digital Network
Like Missouri, California has adopted the traditional three-tier system to regulate the alcohol industry.98 This method separates the interests of manufacturers,
85. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
86. Missouri Broadcasters Association v. Schmitt, 946 F.3d 453, 460 (8 th Cir. 2020).
87. Id. at 461.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 462.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 463.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 458.
98. See California Beer Wholesalers Assn., v. Alcoholic Bev. Etc. Appeals Bd., 487 P.2d 745, 748
(Cal. 1971).
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distributors, and retailers.99 California enacted these laws to combat the threat of
large firms dominating small local markets and “overly aggressive marketing techniques.”100
California prohibits manufacturers and wholesalers from financially investing
in alcohol retail businesses.101 This ban prohibits manufacturers from “providing
anything of value to retailers in exchange for advertising their alcohol products.”102
Retail Digital Network (“RDN”) operates a business in California that installs
advertising displays in different types of retail stores, 103 which includes the operation of digital screen displays in multiple liquor stores throughout the state.104 RDN
contracted with companies to run their ads and then shared those profits with the
retail stores.105 RDN entered into an agreement with St-Germain and Moët Hennessy, two alcohol manufacturers, to run advertisements for them in retail stores.106
The two manufacturers quickly exited the agreement due to the California restriction discussed above.107 Additionally, seven other alcohol manufacturers refused to do business with RDN because they feared the California Alcohol Beverage Control department would enforce the regulation against them.108
RDN filed a lawsuit in federal court contending that the advertising restriction
violated the First Amendment and damaged their business. The District Court for
the Central District of California granted summary judgment to the State of California, relying on Actmedia, Inc. v. Stroh.109 In Actmedia, the court held that California’s code addressed a valid state interest and is therefore constitutional.110 A
three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court’s ruling and held
that the Sorrell standard should have been applied.111 Rehearing this case en banc,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that Actmedia applied and the
regulation did not violate the First Amendment.112
The court reexamined the facts from Actmedia to evaluate the constitutionality
of speech restrictions in California’s liquor control laws. 113 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the first two elements of the Central Hudson test were met.114 There was
no debate on the fact that RDN’s advertisements were legal and not misleading. The
Twenty-First Amendment gave states the right to regulate alcohol within their borders as each state sees appropriate.115 California’s Twenty-First Amendment power
and keeping an orderly marketplace were deemed substantial governmental interests, thus meeting the second element as well.116
99. Id.
100. Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839, 843 (9th Cir. 2017).
101. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25503 (2020).
102. Retail Digital Network, 861 F.3d at 841; CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25503(f)-(h) (2020).
103. Retail Digital Network, 861 F.3d at 842.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 830 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1986); Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839, 842 (9th Cir.
2017).
110. Actmedia, 830 F.2d at 967.
111. Retail Digital Network, 861 F.3d at 842.
112. Id. at 851.
113. Id. at 844; Actmedia, 830 F.2d at 957.
114. Retail Digital Network, at 844.
115. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
116. Retail Digital Network, 861 F.3d at 844.
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The court proceeded to determine whether the third element of the Central
Hudson test was met. California’s goal with Section 25503(h) is to prevent powerful
alcohol manufacturers from exerting undue influence over retailers. 117 The court
found that the regulation furthers that goal by preventing manufacturers and distributors from sidestepping the three-tier system with advertising payoffs to retailers.118
The Ninth Circuit also concluded the fourth element was met. The court opined,
without citing any empirical evidence, that it would be difficult for California to
properly police illegal payoffs for alcohol advertising.119 With that conclusion, the
court held the regulation is narrowly tailored to further the government’s interest of
keeping an orderly marketplace with the three-tier system.120
The court next analyzed whether the standard for protecting commercial speech
is the same now as it was in 1986, when it decided Actmedia. RDN argued that the
court should apply a higher level of scrutiny,121 referencing the Supreme Court’s
phrase “heightened scrutiny” in their Sorrell opinion.122 The Ninth Circuit rejected
this argument, deciding that RDN interpreted Sorrell too expansively and that the
original Central Hudson evaluation still applies.123 The court found that Sorrell did
not change the standard and that “heightened scrutiny” does not mean anything different than “intermediate scrutiny” when evaluating commercial speech restrictions.124
The Ninth Circuit found that California’s liquor control law directly advances
a governmental interest, and that the restriction is narrowly tailored to that interest.125 With that finding, the court held that the law is constitutional and does not
violate the First Amendment.

IV. CIRCUIT SPLIT DISCUSSION
A. Different Levels of Scrutiny Applied
The Eight Circuit, with Missouri Broadcasters, and the Ninth Circuit, with Retail Digital Network, heard two similar cases and reached different decisions. Missouri and California both have laws that prohibit alcohol manufacturers and distributors from financially investing in retail businesses, 126 and directly prohibit wholesalers and distributors from advertising for retailers. Additionally, both laws – in
their practical operation – restrict speech based on the content of the speech and the
identity of the speaker. The Eighth Circuit ruled Missouri’s advertising restriction
violated the First Amendment.127 Conversely, the Ninth Circuit held California’s
regulation is constitutional.128

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 845.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839, 846 (9th Cir. 2017).
Id.
Id.
See id. at 848.
Id. at 851.
See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25503 (2020); MO. REV. STAT. § 311.010-.950 (2016).
Missouri Broadcasters Association v. Schmitt, 946 F.3d 453, 463 (8 th Cir. 2020).
Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839, 853 (9th Cir. 2017).
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Each Circuit applied a different level of scrutiny, leading to these two distinct
holdings. The Ninth Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny created by Central Hudson.129 Alternatively, the Eighth Circuit applied heightened scrutiny derived from
Sorrell.130
The Ninth Circuit’s en banc court determined that the Supreme Court did not
create a new level of scrutiny with its Sorrell decision.131 According the Ninth Circuit, Sorrell did not fundamentally change how the Central Hudson four-part test is
applied to commercial speech regulations.132 The Ninth Circuit opined that the Supreme Court only used the term “heightened scrutiny” to differentiate it from rational basis review and it is no different from intermediate scrutiny. 133 Chief Judge
Thomas dissented from the majority opinion, mainly because he believed Sorrell
did alter the Central Hudson test, in that heightened scrutiny is more strict than
intermediate.134 Judge Thomas drew this conclusion from the Supreme Court’s repeated use of the phrase “heightened scrutiny,” and added language restricting the
use of post hoc rationalizations.135
Interestingly, the three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit described their interpretation of heightened scrutiny in RDN’s first appeal.136 The three-judge panel
slightly amends the third and fourth elements of the Central Hudson test to raise the
standard, making it more difficult to restrict speech. 137 For the third element, the
court required the state to show that the regulation furthers the government’s interest in a “direct and material way.”138 The standard Central Hudson third element
only requires that the regulation “directly advances the governmental interest.” 139
The standard test is a much lighter burden to meet, in that the government does not
have to prove their interest has been materially advanced by the regulation. 140 For
the fourth element, the three-judge panel required a “fit between the legislature’s
ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends.”141 The original Central Hudson standard only requires the regulation to not be “more extensive than is necessary
to serve that interest.”142 This means that the state cannot defend its speech ban with
a post-hoc justification.143 The state’s substantial interest must be the reason for
restricting the speech.144

129. See Daniel J. Croxwall, Cheers to Central Hudson: How Traditional Intermediate Scrutiny Helps
Keep Independent Craft Beer Viable, 113 Nw. U. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 16 (2018).
130. Missouri Broadcasters, 946 F.3d at 463.
131. Retail Digital Network, 861 F.3d at 846.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 847.
134. See id. at 851 (Thomas, S. dissenting).
135. Id. at 851-52 (Thomas, S. dissenting).
136. See Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Appelsmith, 810 F.3d 638, 653-54 (2016).
137. Id.
138. Id. (quoting Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995)).
139. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980).
140. Compare Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Appelsmith, 810 F.3d 638, 653-54 (2016) with Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566.
141. Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Appelsmith, 810 F.3d 638, 654 (2016).
142. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566.
143. See generally Missouri Broadcasters Association v. Schmitt, 946 F.3d 453, 462 (8th Cir. 2020)
(requiring a showing of some evidence indicating a narrow tailoring of the state’s interest, rather than
just a blanket implication of speech.).
144. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566.
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Likewise, the Eighth Circuit used the same “direct and material” phrasing for
the third element as the Ninth Circuit’s three-judge panel.145 That amendment to the
third element adds an extra evidentiary burden for the government to meet: the state
must provide factual evidence that the restriction has furthered the stated governmental interest.146 The Eighth Circuit struck down Missouri’s regulation because
the state did not provide any “empirical or statistical evidence, study, or expert opinion” that proved the efficacy of the restriction.147 The Ninth Circuit’s en banc court
deemed the third and fourth elements of Central Hudson met without any hard evidence presented by the state of California.148 The only evidence required from California that their regulation directly advanced the stated governmental interest was
their reasonable belief that such a law would reduce corruption in the alcohol industry.149
The Eighth Circuit also elevated the standard for meeting the fourth element.
In Missouri Broadcasters, the court did not allow Missouri to give a post hoc rationalization for their speech restriction.150 For the statute to be narrowly tailored,
the Missouri legislature needed to carefully assess the burden on free speech and
weigh that against their stated interest.151
The Eighth and Ninth Circuit also evaluated alternative restrictions that do not
restrict speech with different levels of scrutiny. The Eighth Circuit put the burden
on the state to prove that the other alternatives would not work. 152 Missouri and
California both claimed that policing advertising agreements would be impossible,
without providing any factual evidence.153 The Ninth Circuit accepted California’s
claim without providing thoughtful analysis as to whether the alternative policing
methods could be feasible.154 Conversely, the Eighth Circuit concluded, in the absence of contrary evidence from the state, that there are other policing methods
available that would not restrict speech.155

B. Sorrell is the Correct Standard
Instead of relying on Sorrell, the en banc Ninth Circuit decided to rely on their
own holding from the 1986 Actmedia case.156 As earlier referenced, the Court has
been trending towards an “anti-paternalism” view in the last fifty years.157 Yet, the
Ninth Circuit relied on a 30-year-old precedent, of their own court, rather than the
more recent Sorrell decision issued by the Supreme Court in 2011.158 The Supreme
Court expanded commercial speech protection in Sorrell by requiring that statutes
145. Missouri Broadcasters, 946 F.3d at 460.
146. See generally id. at 462 (concluding that the state of Missouri lacked sufficient evidence regarding
furthering a state interest.)
147. Id.
148. See Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839, 850 (9th Cir. 2017).
149. See id. at 850; Actmedia Inc. v. Stroh, 830 F.2d 957, 967 (9th Cir. 1986).
150. See generally Missouri Broadcasters Association v. Schmitt, 946 F.3d 453, 462 (8th Cir. 2020)
(requiring the State of Missouri to provide some evidence how its restriction was narrowly tailored).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See id. at 462; Actmedia, 830 F.2d at 967.
154. See Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839, 845 (9th Cir. 2017).
155. Missouri Broadcasters, 946 F.3d at 462.
156. Retail Digital Network, at 861 F.3d 851.
157. See discussion supra Part II, Section B.
158. See Retail Digital Network, at 861 F.3d 851.
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be “drawn to achieve” the stated interest and supported by evidence that the statute
actually impacts the interest.159 For those reasons, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly relied on their own precedent from Actmedia instead of adopting the more recent Supreme Court precedent.
The Retail Digital Network three-judge panel correctly held that Sorrell modified the level of scrutiny applied to commercial speech regulation. 160 Not only did
the Supreme Court mention “heightened” ten times, the Court used different language to describe the third and fourth elements of the Central Hudson test.161 Chief
Judge Thomas was correct in his dissent when he argued the “most reasonable reading of Sorrell” is that it did modify the Central Hudson test.162 Unfortunately, the
en banc Ninth Circuit did not adopt the three-judge panel’s standard and instead
applied the older evaluation in Actmedia.
The Eighth Circuit decided in line with the modern trend the Supreme Court
has set. The Eighth Circuit did not blindly accept Missouri’s argument that “undue
influence” continues to pervert the alcohol industry.163 Missouri used the same
method as California to assert that undue influence is a real harm: both states simply
cited history and referenced other states’ tied-house laws.164 The Eighth Circuit applied the heightened third element to reject Missouri’s unsupported argument,
whereas the Ninth Circuit required no evidence to deem California met the third
element.165
The Fourth Circuit has also adopted the Sorrell standard. In Educational Media
Co. at Virginia Tech, Inc. v. Insley, the Fourth Circuit held that a Virginia alcohol
advertising regulation did not meet the fourth element under Sorrell.166 In Insley,
the Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board (“VABC”) prohibited college
newspapers from printing alcohol advertisements.167 The court evaluated the constitutionality of the regulation against Sorrell, and determined that the VABC regulation was more extensive than necessary to reduce underage drinking, therefore
violating the First Amendment under the Central Hudson test.168 Other than the
Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth circuits, alcohol advertisements have not come under judicial scrutiny post-Sorrell. As of now, the Ninth Circuit is alone in claiming that
Sorrell did not alter the four-part Central Hudson test for evaluating commercial
speech regulations.169

V. CONCLUSION
The Eighth and Ninth circuits saw almost identical cases and reached different
conclusions. This split is due to the fact that the Supreme Court did not directly
address whether Sorrell raised the level of scrutiny applied from the traditional Central Hudson test. Also contributing to the split are the archaic alcohol regulatory
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 572 (2011).
See Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Appelsmith, 810 F.3d 638 (2016).
See supra Part IV, Section A
Retail Digital Network v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839, 852 (9th Cir. 2017) (Thomas, S. dissenting).
See Missouri Broadcasters Association v. Schmitt, 946 F.3d 453, 461 (8th Cir. 2020).
Compare Missouri Broadcasters, 946 F.3d at 461 with Retail Digital Network, 861 F.3d at 843.
Retail Digital Network, 861 F.3d at 843.
731 F.3d 291, 302 (2013).
Insley, 731 F.3d at 294.
Insley, at 302.
Retail Digital Network, 861 F.3d at 848.
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schemes that most states have in place. The traditional three-tier systems have not
changed since the 1930s, thus prohibiting them from adapting to modern Court
trends concerning the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. It appears that
states are still hesitant to depart from their strict tied-house laws that they believe
stop undue influence in the alcohol industry.
The Supreme Court did not directly state that Sorrell amended the commercial
speech standard. However, a comprehensive reading of the opinion would leave a
reasonable person with the notion that the Court did intend to raise the level of
scrutiny applied to the four-part Central Hudson test.170 The best fix to the circuit
split on this issue would be for the Supreme Court to hear a case like Missouri
Broadcasters or Retail Digital Network and opine whether the traditional Central
Hudson evaluation should apply or the heightened Central Hudson evaluation.
While the best outcome would be for the Supreme Court to clarify which standard is applied to commercial speech restrictions that are content-based, that is wishful thinking. In the meantime, state legislatures located in the jurisdiction of the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals need to be prepared to present clear evidence that
their regulatory schemes restricting commercial speech further their stated interest.
In contrast, state legislatures located in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction have less of a burden when enacting these regulatory schemes, and must
only show a reasonable belief that the speech restriction will further their stated
interest.171

170. See generally Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 590-91 (implying that there is a different
standard through its choice, and reaffirmation, of the term “heightened” as opposed to intermediate scrutiny).
171. See Retail Digital Network v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839, 850 (9th Cir. 2017); Actmedia Inc. v. Stroh,
830 F.2d 957, 967 (9th Cir. 1986).
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